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Abstract 
A recent model by Akerlof, Dickens and Perry (2000) (ADP) predicts that low 
inflation may cause unemployment to persist at high levels. This finding should be of 
major interest to European countries where inflation is targeted at low levels. We 
specify a small open economy version of the ADP model and apply it to Swedish 
data. The results indicate that raising the Swedish inflation target from 2 to 4% 
would bring long-run unemployment down by two percentage points, to 2.0-2.5%. 
EMU membership, with inflation at the average of the present 0-2% band, would 
raise unemployment to around 6%. Membership thus implies a rejection of a national 
inflation target that could maximize employment. Given that long run 
unemployment-inflation trade-offs can be found in other countries as well, there is 
nothing to suggest that these trade-offs are identical across countries. A single 
inflation rate in the EMU may then cause unemployment to widely exceed the lowest 
sustainable rate in individual countries. We also extend the ADP model by showing 
theoretically that the unemployment minimizing inflation rate could lead to too low 
output. However, empirically we find, both for Sweden and the U.S., that minimum 
unemployment and maximum output occur at roughly the same rate of inflation.  
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 1.  Introduction 
 
 
Following a wave of heavy anti-inflationary policies during the last 
decades, inflation targeting has today become the leading principle of 
monetary policy in many European economies. In the Euro area, the UK 
and Sweden, the targets are in the range 0-2.5 percent, which in a historical 
perspective is strikingly low; no OECD country has experienced inflation 
below two percent for any extended period after WWII and up to the 
1990s.  
The widespread implementation of low-inflation targets suggests a 
strong commitment to the idea of a vertical long run Phillips curve. 
According to this view, inflation has no long run effects on unemployment, 
implying that low unemployment in principle could coexist with low rates 
of inflation.
1 However, combinations of low unemployment and inflation in 
the range of 0-2 percent have not been observed other than for very short 
periods. Indeed, in sustained periods of low unemployment, inflation has 
been considerably higher than two percent.
2 Similarly, the period of low 
inflation since the early 1990s has been characterized by high, or very high, 
jobless rates. 
A number of empirical studies have challenged the conventional wisdom 
that the long run Phillips curve is vertical. In particular, several studies 
have found adverse long run effects of low inflation. For example, Bullard 
and Keating (1995) reported a negative long run response of output to a 
reduction in inflation in European countries with low inflation. Studies on 
the U.S. by King and Watson (1994) and Fair (2000) suggest a long-run 
unemployment-inflation trade-off. 
The possibility of an unemployment-inflation trade-off raises several 
intriguing questions. Rather than attributing high unemployment to shifts in 
the vertical Phillips curve, a trade-off would imply that heavy anti-
inflationary policies might have caused unemployment to persist at high 
levels. This, of course, should be of special concern to countries aiming at 
very low inflation. If a trade-off exists, there should also be some concern 
about the viability of the EMU project. Since there is nothing to suggest 
that the trade-off is identical across member countries, how should an 
inflation target for the whole Euro area be determined? Given that 
                                                           
1  Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1968) worked out the theoretical arguments for the 
vertical Phillips curve. 
2 A case in point is the period 1955-68 when average unemployment in the 19 OECD 
countries was around two percent and average inflation around four percent, i.e., 
substantially higher than the present targets. 
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 membership implies a common (and low) inflation rate, could a country 
obtain more output and employment outside the union by opting for a 
country specific inflation target? 
In addition to the empirical studies mentioned above, a growing 
literature has provided micro-economic rationales for a trade-off between 
unemployment and inflation at low inflation rates. One category of models 
builds on the existence of nominal wage rigidity. Using a wage bargaining 
approach, Akerlof, Dickens and Perry (1996) relies on the adverse effects 
of low inflation on real wage flexibility as originally discussed by Tobin 
(1972). If the inflation rate falls from, say, three to zero percent, some firms 
cannot reduce the nominal wage and are thus exposed to a real wage shock 
that causes unemployment to rise. Holden (2001) constructs a bargaining 
model based on legislation features that rule out unilateral nominal wage 
cuts, giving workers a stronger bargaining position at low inflation. The 
key implication of both models is a long run trade-off between 
unemployment and inflation at low inflation rates. Akerlof et al. (1996) 
applied their model to U.S. data, and later Djoudad and Sargent (1997) and 
Fortin and Dumont (2000) presented results based on Canadian data. 
Dickens (2001) included the same mechanism for a set of European 
countries. All these studies reject the traditional vertical Phillips curve in 
favor of the idea that wage rigidity yields a negatively sloped Phillips curve 
at low inflation.  
Another approach relies on near-rationality, i.e., that agents under certain 
conditions may deviate from profit- or utility maximizing behavior. 
Already thirty years ago, Eckstein and Brinner (1972) noted that in the 
U.S., wage- and price-setters partially ignored inflation during years of low 
inflation. Building on this idea, and referring to extensive sociological and 
psychological evidence, George Akerlof, William Dickens and George 
Perry (2000) (henceforth ADP) present an efficiency wage model in which 
agents’ behavior change as the economy shifts between high and low 
inflation regimes. If inflation is disregarded at low rates, the firm sets a 
lower wage and a lower price relative to nominal aggregate demand. As a 
result, unemployment can be sustained at lower levels than if inflation were 
fully accounted for. When tested on U.S. data, the standard Phillips relation 
is rejected in favor of the near-rationality hypothesis. Fortin and Dumont 
(2000) and Dickens (2001) provide further empirical support for the ADP 
model, for Canada and a number of European countries, respectively.
3 
                                                           
3Also, without relying on money illusion, permanent nominal rigidities or departures 
from full rationality, Karanassou, Sala and Snower (2002) present a model based on 
“frictional growth” from which a long run trade-off can be derived. 
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 The Phillips curve implied by the ADP model has several important 
implications. Above all, the model  identifies an inflation rate that 
minimizes long run unemployment.  Departures from this rate could 
potentially cause large costs in terms of unemployment. This feature makes 
the model particularly interesting to a country like Sweden, where inflation 
is targeted at a low level (two percent) and where full employment is given 
a high priority. For this reason, our primary objective in this paper is to 
estimate an open economy version of the ADP model on Swedish data. 
This allows us to examine whether a different inflation target would tend to 
bring long run unemployment down to a lower level. Our preferred 
regressions (based on survey data on inflation expectations) show that, by 
opting for an inflation target of 3.5-4.5 percent, unemployment could come 
down by two percentage points, to 2.0-2.5 percent.  
Another important implication of the ADP model is that productivity 
changes with the rate of inflation. Consequently, there is no a priori reason 
why maximum output and minimum unemployment would coincide at 
some inflation rate. This aspect of the model was largely neglected by 
Akerlof et al. Therefore, our second objective in this paper is to extend 
their analysis to social optima other than minimum unemployment. We 
show that, in their theoretical model, minimum unemployment and 
minimum output can in fact occur at the same rate of inflation. However, 
our analysis of their empirical results indicates that low unemployment and 
high output more or less go hand-in-hand. Calculations based on our 
estimates of the Swedish long run Phillips curve yield similar results. 
In the section that follows we first discuss agents’ rationales for not 
taking low inflation fully into account. We then proceed to present a 
version of the ADP model suited for a small open economy, and we also 
extend the basic ADP model by analysing how effort (productivity) and 
output respond to changes in the rate of inflation. The econometric 
specifications and our data are introduced in section 3, which also contains 
the empirical results. In the final section we discuss the policy implications 
of our findings.    





 2.  Near-rationality and the Phillips curve  
 
 
2.1  Why inflation is disregarded at low rates 
 
The ADP model recognizes that, during high inflation, all firms behave 
rationally by taking inflation fully into account when they set wages and 
prices. However, a special feature of the model is that some firms tend to 
disregard inflation when it is low and hence behave near-rationally.  
Why would firms disregard low inflation? ADP present a large number 
of arguments (see ADP pp. 4-10 for a comprehensive survey), of which the 
so-called editing argument presumably is the most fundamental. Firms face 
a myriad of every-day decisions concerning product design, whom to 
employ, investments, cost reductions etc, that all are of some importance to 
profits. In such complex situations, firms tend to ignore factors that have 
little effect on profits. ADP show convincingly that losses from 
disregarding inflation in wage- and price-setting actually become negligible 
at low inflation rates. Hence, low-level inflation may simply disappear as a 
variable of relevance to profits.
4  
Is there any empirical support for the existence of near-rational 
behavior? ADP present a range of such evidence for the U.S.
5 For instance, 
the importance of inflation expectations in determining wages seems to 
depend on the inflation rate. ADP show that the magnitude of the 
coefficient on expected inflation depends crucially on the level of inflation. 
High inflation periods tend to yield coefficients around one while low 
inflation periods tend to yield estimated coefficients between zero and .5.
6 
ADP develop their arguments in an efficiency wage framework, 
implying that firms set wages unilaterally. This may be an adequate 
description of the U.S. labor market, but less so of European markets where 
collective bargaining dominates. However, any economy contains elements 
of both unilateral wage setting and bargaining. When applying the ADP 
model to Swedish data we implicitly assume that firms have enough 
latitude for efficiency wage setting. Studies by Agell and Lundborg (1995, 
2003) have also shown that even for a typical bargaining economy like the 
                                                           
4At some low level, inflation may be perceived as price stability. Or, as argued in 
Blinder et al. (1998), “a prominent definition of price stability is inflation so low that it 
ceases to be a factor in influencing decisions”.  
5 See ADP pp 19-27. 
6 A consequence of inflation being disregarded would be a more frequent occurrence of 
nominal price contracts, which seems consistent with casual observations. 
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2.2 The ADP model for a small open economy 
 
2.2.1  Effort and wage setting 
Firms may, at any point in time, behave either rationally (indexed r) or 
near-rationally (nr). Rationality is characterized by firms’ wage setting 
behavior. Rational firms know their workers’ inflation expectations and 
incorporate these in wage setting. For reasons discussed in section 2.1, 
“near-rational” firms neglect to incorporate inflation when it is low. 
Whether a firm behaves rationally or near-rationally is not exogenously 
given but will be determined by the rate of inflation.  





. Let the effort that a firm of type j=r, nr expects 
from their employees be a function of the wage, wj, relative an expected 
reference wage,  j w , and expected unemployment, u
e.  Firms paying wj 















=− + +      (1) 
 
where  α  is  a constant in the zero to unity interval. A,  B and C are all 
positive constants. 
Firms set wages for the next period after having projected the effects of 
inflation on the reference wage of their workers. This expected reference 
wage, 
eR
j w , determines the wage that a firm should pay and is specified as:  
 
1(1 ) eR e
r ww π − = +        ( 2 a )  
1
eR
nr ww − =       ( 2 b )  
 
where  1 w−  is last period’s average wage and π




j j we  implies that the Solow condition will be 
                                                           
7 See also Chen and Edin (2002). 
8 One could generalize (2b) such that some fraction of inflation is incorporated. ADP 
specify the theoretical model in this way, but in their empirical work they apply (2b). 
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 satisfied, i.e., that the elasticity of expected effort with respect to the wage 

















.     (3) 
 
Workers’ actual reference wage is specified as  1(1 ) R e ww π − = + , i.e., all 
workers form their reference wage on the basis of last period’s average 
wage. In addition, all workers want full compensation for expected 
inflation in consumer prices. If inflation is above zero, the implication is 
that rational firms base their wage setting decision on workers’ true 
reference wage whereas near-rational firms underestimate it. The effort 
level supplied by workers in firm type j, ej, can be found by substituting 
R w  
for 
eR
j w  in (1); that is, eA .  (/)
e R
jj B w wC
α =− + + u
The essence of the ADP model is summarized in Figure 1. Assuming a 
positive rate of inflation, near-rational firms base their wage setting on a 
reference wage that is lower than the one applied by fully rational firms 
( ; see equation (2)). Hence, at a given wage rate, it follows from 
(1) that near-rational firms expect a higher effort level. The vertical 
distance between the two curves in Figure 1 illustrates this. We assume that 
the Solow condition is satisfied at point A for rational firms. From (3) we 
infer that the relation between the wage and the expected reference wage 
should be identical in the two types of firms. Thus, wages will be set such 
that expected effort is identical in all firms: while rational firms opt for 
point A, near-rational firms end up at point B.  
eR eR
nr r ww <
Actual effort in rational firms is, of course, identical to expected effort. 
This is however not the case for near-rational firms. Since all workers have 
identical reference wages, it follows that workers in near-rational firms 
react to the lower wage (point B) by opting for a lower effort level. This 
outcome is illustrated by point C in Figure 1. (Note that only the lower 
curve is consistent with workers’ true reference wage.) Hence, at the wage 
rate paid by near-rational firms, the Solow condition will be satisfied with 




 Figure 1.  Wages and effort levels 
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As will become clear below, wage differences across different types of 
firms will remain in place also in the long run.
9 One can, of course, 
question this property of the model. However, we can think of at least two 
arguments that can be put forward in its defense. As noted by ADP, the 
differences are small at reasonable levels of inflation.  Moreover, it can be 
argued that workers compare wage rates per effort unit rather than just 
wages. Rational firms will indeed pay higher wages per effort unit, but the 




2.2.2  Prices and profits 
In an open economy, as assumed here, the average consumer price level  p 
is determined as a weighted average of the prices set by domestic and 
foreign producers: 
 
. (1 ) dm p mp m p =− +      (4) 
 
                                                           
)
9 It should be noted that the wage difference across firms does not cumulate over time. 
From (2) and (3) we see that wages in both types of firms are multiples of last period’s 
average wage, which means that the relation  /( 1
e
rn r ww π =+  holds in each period. 
10 For positive inflation rates, equations (1)-(3) imply that 
/( 1 rn r ww ) π > =+ (/ ) ( / r r nr nr we w e ÷ ) (1 ) / (1 ) 1
α απ π α
− = ++ + −    >1.  
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 d p  is the domestic consumer price, 
m p  the price of imported consumer 
goods and m the value of imported consumer goods as a share of total 
consumption. The quantity theory, with a constant normalized to unity, 
then gives us real income (aggregate demand) as  / M p, where M is the 
supply of money. We assume n monopolistically competitive firms that 
divide total aggregate demand between them according to the relative 
prices for their respective goods. These firms are either domestic or 
foreign, but in the following we focus solely on the behavior of domestic 
firms.  
Domestic firms set the price 
d
j p  for their products and demand is given 
by ) ) (/
d
j (/ M np p p
β − , where β is the price elasticity of demand. The first 














     (5) 
 
Thus the domestic price is determined as a markup β/(β-1) on the expected 
unit efficiency labor cost. 












=  −      (6) 
 
where the term outside brackets represents the share of total demand for a 
firm of type j. The expression within brackets shows the profit per unit of 
output sold, i.e., the price less the wage in units of actual effort. Using our 
expressions for prices, wages and actual effort levels, it follows from (6) 
that near-rationality causes a relative decrease in profits equal to
11 
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2.2.3  Share of near-rational firms and the Phillips curve 
A closer examination of (7) suggests that the losses of disregarding low 
inflation (say, below five percent) are negligible. As inflation increases, 
however, the losses will eventually become substantial. (See ADP pp.15-
                                                           
11 In these calculations expected and actual inflation are assumed to be identical. 
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 16.)  In line with the reasoning in section 2.1, one would therefore expect 
near-rational firms to become increasingly aware of foregone profits as 
inflation increases. Assuming that this “tolerance” towards losses differs 
across firms, it then follows that more and more firms would switch to fully 
rational behavior. When inflation reaches a sufficiently high level, all firms 
incorporate inflation in wage- and price setting, and we are back in a world 
of fully rational agents. 
        In the ADP model the above mechanism is specified in terms of 
threshold levels for losses induced by near-rational behavior relative to 
profits under full rationality. Once the relative loss reaches this threshold 
level, the firm switches from near-rational to fully rational behavior, or vice 
versa.
12 Heterogeneity enters by assuming a normal distribution of these 
thresholds, with mean µ and standard deviation σ. From (7) we then obtain 
the fraction of near-rational price setters as: 
 

















−+ − − −
+− +
−Φ ,   (8) 
 
where Φ is the standard cumulative normal distribution.  
To derive the price Phillips curve, we proceed as follows.
13 Using 
equations (1) and (3) in equation (5) we may determine  ,
d
nr t p  and  ,
d
rt p . 
These are then used in  
 




n r t p p =Φ + −Φ p
                                                          
     (9) 
 
which determines the average price level as a weighted average of prices 
set by rational and near-rational firms. With the corresponding expression 
at  t-1, and some tedious calculations, we obtain the domestic short-run 
price Phillips curve as 
 
 
12 That is, the same mechanism applies whether the loss crosses the threshold from 
above or from below. 
13 We can summarize the equation system on level form as follows. The model consists 
of equation (4), two equations (2), two equations (1), two equations (3) and two 
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The long run steady-state Phillips relation is characterized by equality 
between actual and expected inflation and by a constant (and known) 
unemployment rate. In our open economy version, inflation in consumer 
prices (π)  is a weighted average of inflation in prices of domestically 
produced goods (π
d) and inflation in prices of imported goods (π
m), or, π = 
(1-m)π
d + mπ
m. We assume that exchange rates adjust so that, expressed in 
domestic currency, π
m = π
d = π holds for the long run. The Phillips relation 














 .     (11) 
 
The standard, fully vertical long run Phillips curve, which implies that 
unemployment always equals a “natural” rate, is derived under the 
assumption of full rationality. By allowing for near-rationality, we may 
note from (11) that this Phillips curve will, in general, not be vertical. 
Hence, the conventional concept of a “natural” rate of unemployment is 
less relevant for the ADP model; in the following we let the natural rate 
denote the level of unemployment that obtains when all firms behave 
rationally. This special case of (11) occurs if inflation is sufficiently high 
such that Φ =1. Since disregarding zero inflation is equivalent to fully 
rational behavior, the natural rate also obtains at π = 0. From (11) we see 
that the natural rate is given by is u
n = (A-B(1-α))/C. The properties of the 




2.3  Extensions: Analysis of social optima 
 
The Phillips curve in equation (11) implies a long run unemployment-
inflation trade-off. ADP focused entirely on this trade-off and the inflation 
rate that minimizes unemployment. However, in a footnote they also 
recognized that, in their model, “…productivity varies with the rate of 
inflation. Therefore, at the minimum unemployment rate, output is not at its 
maximum.” (ADP p.19, footnote 28). The purpose of this section is to 
extend ADP’s analysis beyond the unemployment-inflation trade-off in 
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 order to gain a deeper understanding of the relation between inflation and 
welfare. Specifically, we shall explore the relation between inflation and 
other variables of importance to welfare, like effort and output 
(consumption). A major insight verified below is that the model does not 
rule out an effort-inflation trade-off at low inflation rates. Consequently, 
since employment and effort may go in different directions, we cannot rule 
out the possibility that output drops as inflation rises. In this situation, 
government decision-making obviously becomes more complicated than 
just directing monetary policy towards the inflation rate that minimizes 
unemployment.  
The question whether effort and output increases or decreases in 
inflation is thus an empirical issue. Therefore, in order to give some 
quantitative content to the discussion below, we use the estimates reported 
by ADP for the U.S. in one of their “representative” Phillips curve 
regressions (see the first column of their Table 2  (p. 32)). This will serve 
as an illustration of the theoretical implications of the model as well as 
providing a firmer foundation for ADP’s results with respect to the welfare-
inflation relation.    
This section is outlined as follows. First we briefly recapitulate the 
theoretical implications of the Phillips curve derived in the previous section 
(see ADP for a more detailed discussion). We then turn to the relation 
between effort and inflation, and, in the final subsection, the relation 
between output and inflation. Throughout this section we limit the analysis 





Starting at price stability (i.e., π = 0), we see from (11) that unemployment 
equals the natural rate. As inflation increases above zero, however, near-
rational firms opt for a wage that is lower than the wage set by fully 
rational firms. As this implies a lower average wage compared to the wage 
in an economy where all firms always behave rationally, unemployment 
will be lower than the natural rate. Consequently, the long run Phillips 
curve has a negatively sloped segment at low inflation rates. 
As inflation rises, there are two opposing forces at work. While near-
rational firms disregard more inflation, which tends to further reduce 
unemployment, it also becomes increasingly costly for firms to behave this 
way. More and more firms therefore switch to full rationality, and hence set 
                                                           
14 Note also that we do not assign any direct costs to inflation. We are not aware of 
studies that have found any significant negative social costs of inflation in the low to 
medium ranges that we have in mind. 
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 higher wages, which tends to increase unemployment. Eventually, at some 
inflation rate, the share of rational firms has increased to such an extent that 
unemployment actually starts to increase. This process continues until 
inflation has reached the level at which all firms have switched to fully 
rational behavior. At this level of inflation and above, unemployment is 
again at its natural rate.  
Thus, the theoretical model yields the hump-shaped long run Phillips 
curve that ADP show in their Figure 1 (p. 18). Moreover, their empirical 
analysis forcefully supports the model. The shape of the Phillips curve has 
several interesting implications. Firstly there exists a lowest sustainable 
unemployment rate of inflation (LSURI), yielding the lowest sustainable 
unemployment rate (LSUR).  Formally, the LSURI is the inflation rate 
where  u π ∂∂=0 in (11). Secondly, we may conclude that price stability is 
associated with maximum unemployment. 
 
 
2.3.2  Effort 
We consider, in turn, effort in rational firms, effort in near-rational firms, 
and average effort. For rational firms, using (3) and (11) in actual effort,    
er = -A + Cu +( / ) R
r Bw w α , where  1(1 ) R ww π − = + , we find that long-run 














      (12) 
 
Differentiating (12) with respect to inflation and evaluating at π = 0 shows 
that effort rises as we leave price stability. Comparing (11) and (12), it is 
obvious that the inflation rate that minimizes unemployment (LSURI) also 
is the rate that maximizes effort in rational firms. Thus, effort in rational 
firms will have the properties of the curve labeled “er“ in Figure 2, which 
we have derived from the estimation results reported by ADP. As inflation 
increases from zero to a positive number, unemployment drops and this 
will tend to reduce effort. In the new equilibrium, however, firms have 
raised the wage relative to the reference wage - which tends to increase 
effort - in order to restore the Solow condition. It can easily be shown that 
this condition implies that the wage effect always dominates the direct 
effect of a change in unemployment. When inflation rises beyond the 
LSURI, and unemployment starts to increase, firms will set a lower wage 
relative to the reference wage, implying that effort starts to decline.  











++ − =        (13) 
 
As expected, the two effort levels, er and enr, are identical at π  = 0. 
However, that is where the similarities end. Differentiating enr, it can be 
shown that  / 0 nr e π ∂∂ ≤  for any non-negative inflation rate. Thus, unlike 
effort in rational firms, effort in near-rational firms decreases as we leave 
price stability, and it continues to decline as inflation increases. This is 
illustrated by the curve labeled “enr“ in Figure 2 (again based on the 
empirical results reported by ADP for the U.S.). Why does effort in rational 
and near-rational firms differ? As inflation increases from zero, the 
reduction in unemployment tends to lower effort in both types of firms. 
However, as noted above, firms will react by setting a higher wage so as to 
restore the Solow condition. This is true also for the near-rational firms, but 
by neglecting inflation the wage increase will be smaller than the increase 
in workers’ reference wage. As a consequence, workers in these firms face 
both lower unemployment and a lower wage relative to the reference wage, 
and both effects have a negative impact on effort.
15  
Hence, effort in the two types of firms responds very differently as 
inflation increases, and the relative strength of the responses will be 
important in determining average effort. By definition, average effort is e = 
Φer + (1-Φ)enr, and using (12) and (13) we obtain 
 






+ +− =Φ + − Φ        (14) 
 
where the share of rational firms, Φ, increases in inflation. Differentiating e 
with respect to π, and evaluating at π = 0, yields 
 
0




∂ =− −Φ − ≤
∂
         (15) 
 
                                                           
15 Note that the theoretical model above relies on the assumption that near-rational firms 
disregard all inflation. ADP also make this assumption in their empirical specification. 
In this case, effort in near-rational firms must decrease as inflation rises. However, if 
only some fraction of inflation is disregarded, effort in near-rational firms can (for some 




 We thus infer that average effort drops as we move from price stability to 
positive inflation.
16 Since e = er at π = 0, and since e again approaches er 
when inflation becomes sufficiently high, average effort will have a 
minimum at some intermediate inflation rate. Consider, for example, how 
average effort changes at the inflation rate that minimizes unemployment 
(LSURI): 
 


















     (16) 
 
From (16) we note that the inflation rate associated with minimum effort 
may be either lower or higher than the LSURI. As indicated by the curve 
labeled “e“ in Figure 2, the estimation results reported by ADP for the U.S. 
suggest that average effort reaches a minimum at an inflation rate very 
close to the LSURI. 
 
 
2.3.3  Output 
Normalizing the labor force to unity, we define output (Q) as  
 
Q = (1-u)e ,        (18) 
 
where the unemployment rate, u, and average effort, e, are given by (11) 
and (14), respectively. As discussed above, the model predicts that 
employment and effort will move in opposite directions as inflation 
increases from zero to a small positive number. This, of course, opens for 
the possibility that output can go in either direction, depending on whether 
the boost in employment outweighs the reduction in effort. Differentiating 
(18) with respect to inflation, the first order condition for optimum output 
requires that  
 
(1 ) u e
ππ ε ε




π ε  is the elasticity of average effort with respect to inflation and 
1 u
π ε −  the elasticity of employment with respect to inflation. Equation (19) 
states that, at maximum output, the two elasticities should match, i.e., 
inflation should be determined so that the percentage change in 
employment equals the percentage change in effort.  
                                                           
16 As discussed in the previous footnote, the model can be constructed such that effort in 
near-rational firms increases in inflation when inflation is low. Average effort would 
then, of course, also be positively related to inflation. 
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 To see how output changes with inflation, we first evaluate the derivative 
Q π ∂∂   at  π  = 0. It is straightforward to verify that the sign of the 
derivative is indeterminate; that is, output may increase or decrease as 
inflation rises above zero. Thus, theory does not rule out a trade-off 
between output and inflation at low inflation rates. What does ADP’s 
Phillips curve regression imply about the relation between output and 
inflation for the U.S.? Figure 2 illustrates how employment (1-u) and effort 
(e) move in different directions. At low rates of inflation the increase in 
employment more than outweighs the reduction in effort, which suggests 
that there is a positive relation between output (Q) and inflation. Output 
then rises as inflation accelerates, and this continues until the change in 
employment exactly balances the change in effort  (i.e., until the condition 
in (19) is satisfied). Our calculations show that the output maximizing rate 
of inflation is very close to the LSURI. Output is maximized at an inflation 
rate of 3.5 percent, while maximum employment obtains at a slightly lower 
inflation rate, 3.4 percent.  
To sum up this section, what can be said about the overall welfare 
implications of the model? For simplicity, let us disregard distributional 
issues and consider a function in which welfare depends positively on 
output (consumption) and negatively on effort and unemployment. If the 
unemployment-inflation trade-off were significantly stronger than the 
effort-inflation trade-off, then output maximum and unemployment 
minimum would occur at roughly the same rate of inflation. Hence, since 
both output and employment would be high and effort low, the LSURI 
would unambiguously be associated with a high level of welfare.
17 If, on 
the other hand, the effort-inflation trade-off were significantly stronger than 
the unemployment-inflation trade-off, then there would be an output-
inflation trade-off as well. In this case, the level of welfare associated with 
the LSURI would be ambiguous.  
In ADP’s representative regression the welfare implications appear 
unambiguous. Not only does the LSURI yield minimum unemployment 
and, roughly, maximum output, but it also implies an effort level very close 
to its minimum. Hence, all three arguments tend to affect welfare 
favorably. 
 
                                                           
17 If the unemployment-inflation and the effort-inflation trade-offs were approximately 
the same, then output would remain unaffected by changes in inflation. As a result, 
since employment would be high and effort low, the LSURI would again be associated 
with a high level of welfare. 
15 
 
 Figure 2.  Employment, effort, output and inflation in the U.S. 

















Note: The curves are based on ADP´s regression presented in the first column of their 
Table 2  (p. 32). Each variable is expressed in terms of the percentage change compared 
to the value at price stability. For instance, the value of e at π=2% equals ((eπ=2 - eπ=0)/ 
eπ=0)*100. The employment curve (1-u) can be derived directly from the estimated 
Phillips curve. For the effort functions, however, we note that ADP’s empirical 
specification leaves the parameters A, B, C, and α  unidentified. By expressing the 
variables in terms of relative changes rather than levels, the only unknown parameter is 
α. To simplify the exposition, we have drawn the curves for α = 0.5. As this parameter 
is in the zero to unity interval, one can easily study how the curves change as this 
parameter changes. For example, the average effort curve (e) shifts to the right as α 
increases, and for α approaching unity the curve becomes almost vertical. As a 
consequence, the output curve (Q) approaches the employment curve (1-u). 
 
ADP applied the model to the U.S., but it can be argued that their model is 
of even greater interest to economies with explicit inflation targets (or 
bands). In the section that follows, we shall apply the model to Sweden, 
where an inflation target of two percent has been in operation since the 
mid-90s. We ask to what extent conclusions for the U.S. carry over to a 
small open economy, how the Phillips curves at low inflation differ 
between Sweden and the U.S., and, in particular, if the present Swedish 
inflation target is far off Sweden’s LSURI and output maximizing inflation 
level. This analysis may also promote a better understanding of the 
consequences of membership in the EMU, where countries when entering 
give up the possibility of setting a national inflation target. 




3.  The Swedish long-run Phillips curve 
 
 
3.1  Empirical specifications and data 
 
In order to proceed towards an empirical specification, we return to 





tt t dg u u e
t π πγ =− + Φ + ∆.     (20) 
 
In line with ADP, we approximate the argument in the standard normal 
c.d.f. as derived in (8) by  2
L DE π + , where D and E are parameters.
18 πL 
represents the effects of past inflation on the likelihood that people act 
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where  and k are parameters, X is a vector of dummy variables, 
and ε
1 ,,,, dDEaa 2
i is the error term.  
We proxy πL by several different specifications suggested by ADP. One 
is a geometrically declining weighted moving average of past inflation: 
 
  , ,1 1 , (1 ) Lt L tt π δπ δ π −− = −+      (22) 
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18 When ADP in a number of simulations approximated the loss function by  2
L Eπ  
(where E was chosen so that the approximation was identical to the “true” loss at five 
percent inflation) this loss was never off by more than three percent of the true loss. 
Moreover, a constant term, D, was added so as not to constrain the share of rational 
firms to 50 percent at zero inflation. (For details, see ADP pp.28-29.) 
17 
 
 where  λ is estimated, i indexes quarters and I is set to 16 quarters. In 








g π π −
=
=∑ ,               (24) 
 
in which the weights gi are estimated (0 1 i g ≤ ≤  and ∑ ) and the lag 
length  I is set to 16 quarters. To reduce the number of parameters in 










To control for inflation expectations, π
e, the predominant method has 
been to apply some adaptive expectations scheme. Like ADP, we shall first 
follow this estimation procedure and apply (22)-(24) also for this variable. 
We also run regressions allowing the weights in (24) to differ across 
quarters. In addition, we are fortunate to have an interesting set of survey 
data on households’ inflation expectations that we shall utilize. 
In determining expected unemployment, u
e, we set the lag length to 
either two or twelve periods. We first run regressions on open 
unemployment, but later vary these to include several alternative measures 
of unemployment.  
Our relevant price inflation index for the dependent variable is one that 
measures prices of goods produced domestically and consumed 
domestically. For a large economy like the U.S. (for which ADP estimate 
their model), the consumer price index may be a relevant index. This, 
however, would not be the case for a small open economy like the Swedish. 
Taking the differences of (4), holding the import share constant, we may 
derive the relevant price inflation for goods produced and consumed in a 














                                          (25) 
 
which is our dependent variable. 
We use quarterly data from 1963:1 to 2000:2 which are annualized by 
calculating the percentage change in the relevant price indices during the 
last four quarters.
19  
                                                           
19 Our quarterly data are in turn based on the average value of the price level of the three 
months that constitute each quarter. 
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 Estimating the model for a small open economy implies that one must 
consider the dependence on external factors. As mentioned above, our 
dependent variable, inflation in products produced and consumed in 
Sweden, is determined as the difference between CPI and imported 
inflation. However, our inflation series for imported goods includes not 
only consumption goods but also intermediary goods. This introduces a 
measurement error into our domestic inflation series in periods when prices 
of intermediate goods move differently than prices of consumption goods. 
To account for this, we introduce a number of dummy variables to capture 
oil price increases in 1973-74 and 1979-1981, and decreases in 1986. 
Dummies also cover price hikes on food inputs in the early 1970s, the 
Swedish tax reform in 1990-91 and the extreme wage increases in 1995-96 
that can be traced to foreign increases in prices of pulp and paper. All 
variables are defined in greater detail in Appendix 1.  
 
   
3.2  Results 
 
Using maximum-likelihood methods, we have estimated a total of 120 
specifications. The regressions differ with respect to sample periods, 
measures of unemployment and the way in which inflation expectations are 
accounted for. We consider 113 regressions to have come out without any 
major problems in terms of identification, meaningful parameter estimates 
etc.
20 
The following result section deals exclusively with the long-run Phillips 
curve.
21 We first focus on the results using estimated (adaptive) inflation 
expectations, not because we place more trust in these results, but simply 
because this is the conventional way of dealing with expectations. We then 
present what we consider to be a more reliable set of results based on 
surveys of inflation expectations.  
 
                                                           
g
20 For the remaining cases we ran into similar problems as ADP did for the U.S. For 
instance, in some regressions, the estimates of D and E tended to approach minus 
infinity and infinity, respectively. We cannot say whether this is due to data limitations 
or if data actually reject the hypothesis that Φ varies with inflation; if the true value of Φ 
is unity, then E and D cannot be identified. 
21 Imposing equality between expected and actual inflation, and a constant unemploy-
ment rate, the long run Phillips relation implied by (20) is ud (/)( 1 )/ g π = −− Φ . The 
“natural” rate of unemployment, defined as the rate that obtains when all firms are 
rational, is thus given as u
n = d/g. 
19 
 
 3.2.1  Estimated expectations 
If the parameter E is zero, the coefficient on expectations will not vary with 
inflation, which would reject the theory. In 23 of our 24 regressions we 
find, though, that E is significantly positive as predicted by theory.
22 The 
average estimate of the LSUR is 2.08 percent, obtained when inflation is 
targeted at 2.61 percent. The vast majority of LSURs ranges between 1.6 
and 2.5 percent and the associated LSURIs range between 2.0 and 3.0 
percent.
23 
Figure 3 summarizes some crucial features of the long run Phillips 
curves implied by the regressions. For each regression we have evaluated 
the unemployment rate associated with zero, two, four, six and eight 
percent inflation. To obtain a “representative” Phillips curve we then fitted 
a curve through the average unemployment rate at the different levels of 
inflation.
24 For instance, consider the effect on unemployment of changing 
the rate of inflation from zero to the LSURI. The gains are large as we 
leave absolute price stability. The marginal gains are then gradually 
reduced as we approach the LSURI, where the total reduction in 
unemployment amounts to almost 2.5 percentage points.  
 











                                                           
22 As discussed in section 3.1, we use four alternative measures for 
e π , three measures 
for πL, and two alternative lag lengths for unemployment. This gives us 24 possible 
combinations. In one regression we obtained estimates that implied a value of Φ equal 
to unity regardless of the rate of inflation. We deleted this single regression in the 
following presentation. 
23 These results are summarized in Figure 5, in section 3.2, below. 
24 We capture the unemployment minimum by fitting the curve through the average 







Table 1.  Estimated parameters for the long run Phillips curve 1963-2000
a 
Independent  
variables and  
characteristics 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
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weights, eq. (23) 
16-quarter MA 
with different 
weights for each 
year, eq. (24) 
16-quarter MA 
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weights for each 
quarter, eq. (24) 
16-quarter lag 
with different 
weights for each 
quarter, eq. (24)
Unemployment 
measure  Open unempl.  Open unempl.  Open unempl.  Open unempl.  Open unempl.  Open unempl. 
No. of unempl. 
lags  2 12 2 12 2 12 
Sample period  1963:1-2000:2  1963:1-2000:2 1963:1-2000:2 1963:1-2000:2 1963:1-2000:2  1963:1-2000:2
LSURI  2.98  2.81 2.64 2.38 2.54 2.23 
LSUR  1.61 1.94 2.26 2.57 2.08 2.71 
Φ(π=0.0)  0.300 0.519 0.602 0.679 0.556 0.716 
Φ(π=2.0)  0.399 0.606 0.687 0.764 0.655 0.801 
Φ(π=4.0)  0.707 0.826 0.879 0.931 0.882 0.953 
Φ(π=6.0)  0.970 0.980 0.990 0.997 0.994 0.999 
u(π=0.0)  0.053 0.047 0.041 0.047 0.044 0.042 
u(π=2.0)  0.022 0.022 0.024 0.026 0.022 0.027 
u(π=4.0)  0.022 0.025 0.028 0.035 0.029 0.035 
u(π=6.0)  0.048 0.043 0.039 0.046 0.043 0.042 
DW-statistic  1.531  1.506 1.348 1.619 1.518 1.551 
R
2  0.868 0.873 0.860 0.871 0.879 0.886 
a Asymptotic t-values in parentheses. Detailed results for all regressions are available on request.
  In  Table 1 we present detailed results of six selected regressions. For 
example, the table shows the size of the coefficient on inflationary 
expectations,  Φ, when evaluated at different rates of inflation. At zero 
inflation, the size varies across models from .30 (model 1) to .72 (model 6). 
The coefficient then increases with inflation and is close to unity when 
inflation reaches six percent. Recall that the theoretical model interprets the 
coefficient Φ as the share of fully rational firms. This interpretation thus 
suggests that many firms take inflation fully into account already at price 
stability, and almost all firms behave rationally at six percent inflation. 
So far, the results have indicated a great deal of robustness to variations 
in the way expectations are estimated. However, we are also interested in 
investigating how the model performs with respect to other definitions of 
unemployment and to other sample periods. The results are presented in 
some detail in Appendix 2. The LSURI does not change in any significant 
way when open unemployment is replaced by total unemployment or 
unemployment among prime aged males. In some regressions we excluded 
the turbulent 1990s. This shifted the LSURs downwards while the LSURIs 
were not significantly affected. 
 
 
3.2.2  Direct measures of expected inflation 
It is far from obvious that estimated adaptive expectations capture 
households’ true expectations on inflation. To illustrate this point, Figure 4 
contrasts the expectations implied by model 5 in Table 1 to survey data on 
households’ expectations which is available for the period 1979:3-2000:2. 
The estimated series follows CPI quite closely. Notable is that there are 
apparent deviations from the directly measured inflation expectations. 
Given that the survey data better reflect households’ true inflation 
expectations, one might suspect that the results obtained above could be 
misleading. 
Although our survey data are restricted to 1979-2000, we re-estimated 
the model using these data. The results for some of our regressions are 
reported in Table 2, as models 1, 2 and 3. A vital observation is that the 
change of data does not cause a rejection of the overall results discussed 
above. The parameter E is still, without exception, significantly positive. 
Hence, as predicted by theory, the reaction coefficient of price inflation to 
expected inflation (Φ) is significantly smaller in low- than in high-inflation 
periods. Figure 5 shows that the average LSURI using survey data (4.01 
percent) is somewhat higher than the average obtained with estimated 
expectations (2.61 percent). Similarly, the average LSUR increases when 
22 
 
 we substitute survey data for estimated expectations (from 2.08 to 2.85 
percent).  
One disadvantage of using the relatively short survey data series is that 
we are unable to utilize the full length of the data on inflation and 
unemployment. Moreover, the relatively short sample period raises the 
question whether the results from these regressions may have been plagued 
by small sample bias. To address these issues, we next imputed survey data 
for the period 1963:1-1979:2 in order to obtain a full survey data series for 
1963:1-2000:2.
25 Table 2, models 4-6, shows detailed results from some 
regressions based on this extended survey data set. The plot in Figure 5 
illustrates the most important result, namely that the LSURIs are very 
similar to those obtained using the original survey data. Hence, the LSURIs 
appear not to be affected by the sample period.  
To give an idea of what the individual Phillips curves look like, Figure 
6 displays two representative curves from the regressions where we used 
survey data on inflation expectations. There is a clear indication that 
inflation needs to be around four percent in order to be compatible with the 
lowest sustainable rate of unemployment. Note also that a monetary policy 
aiming at price stability appears to bring large costs in terms of high 
unemployment, around seven percent, which should be compared to the 2-
2.5 percent associated with four percent inflation.  
Can the Phillips curve(s) in Figure 6 predict Sweden’s recent 
macroeconomic performance? The problem is, of course, that we cannot 
tell whether actual observations on unemployment and inflation reflect a 
long run relation or merely capture short run deviations from the long run 
Phillips curve. However, the fact that the Swedish Riksbank during the last 
ten years
26 has targeted inflation (at two percent) is helpful in this respect. 
After a short period of virtual price stability, inflation gradually converged 
to two percent and has been stable around this level for a period exceeding 
two years. Unemployment fell continuously during the latter part of the 
1990s, from around eight percent in 1997 down to four percent, a level at 
which it has been stable for more than two years. At two percent inflation, 




                                                           
25 We fitted a regression model that determines our survey data as a non-linear function 
of lagged CPI and predicted a series for the 1963:1-1979:2 period.  
26 An inflation target of two percent (with a lower and upper bound of one and three 
percent, respectively) was announced in 1993, and the Riksbank assessed that the target 




Table 2.  Estimated parameters for the long run Phillips curve
a 
Independent  
variables and  
characteristics 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
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measure  Open unempl.  Open unempl. Open unempl. Open unempl.  Open unempl.  Open unempl. 
No. of unempl. 
lags  2 12 2 12  2  12 
Sample period  1979:3-2000:2  1979:3-2000:2 1979:3-2000:2 1963:1-2000:2 1963:1-2000:2  1963:1-2000:2
LSURI*100  3.76  4.01 3.97 4.50  3.83  4.47 
LSUR*100 2.09 2.96 3.52  2.31  2.35  2.26 
Φ(π=0.0) 0.130  0.182  0.305  0.096  0.063  0.094 
Φ(π=2.0) 0.185  0.234  0.360  0.130  0.104  0.128 
Φ(π=4.0) 0.420  0.427  0.535  0.275  0.332  0.276 
Φ(π=6.0) 0.831  0.764  0.798  0.613  0.827  0.621 
u(π=0.0) 0.076  0.065  0.075  0.073  0.076  0.072 
u(π=2.0) 0.038  0.041  0.047  0.044  0.041  0.043 
u(π=4.0) 0.021  0.030  0.035  0.024  0.024  0.024 
u(π=6.0) 0.052  0.043  0.049  0.034  0.055  0.034 
DW-statistic  1.002  1.150 1.056 1.544  1.283  1.432 
R
2  0.933  0.948 0.931 0.876  0.847  0.872 
a Asymptotic t-values in parentheses. Detailed results for all regressions are available on request.
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Note: The curves are generated from the results for Model 5 in Table 2. Each variable is 
expressed in terms of the percentage change compared to the value at price stability. By 
expressing the variables in terms of relative changes rather than levels, the only 
unknown parameter is α. To simplify the exposition, we have drawn the curves for α = 
0.5. (See the corresponding note in Figure 2 for more details.) 
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 We have in this section focused entirely on the unemployment-inflation 
trade-off. However, as noted in section 2.3 above, alternative social optima 
may exist and the inflation rate that minimizes unemployment could in 
principle be associated with a low level of output. What do our regressions 
for Sweden imply about the relation between output and inflation? Figure 7 
explores the results for the regression based on survey data 1963-2000 that 
was shown in Figure 6 (model 5 in Table 2). First, our calculations show 
that average effort (e) reaches its minimum at an inflation rate very close to 
the LSURI. Second, the increase in employment (1-u) more than outweighs 
the reduction in effort, implying a positive relation between output (Q) and 
inflation when inflation is low. Moreover, output maximum and 
unemployment minimum occur at roughly the same rate of inflation, 
slightly below four percent. Moving from two to four percent inflation 





4.  Policy discussion 
 
Akerlof et al. (2000) strongly rejected the vertical long run Phillips curve 
when their model was applied to U.S. data. In the present paper we have 
shown that Swedish data also reject the idea of a vertical curve. This 
finding has a number of interesting implications for the Swedish economy 
and, potentially, for other European countries as well.  
 First, a major consequence is that the level of the inflation target really 
matters. The Swedish two percent target appears to be far off the level that 
minimizes unemployment. By doubling inflation, unemployment could in 
the long run settle at 2-3 percent and have considerable output effects. 
Hence, the conclusion must be that the Swedish Riksbank has pursued a 
highly contractive monetary policy during the period of targeting, i.e., since 
the mid-1990s. We cannot say whether the ECB’s policy has been 
contractive or not; however, with inflation targeted even lower than in 
Sweden, and with EURO-land experiencing very high unemployment rates, 
this could well be the case.  
Secondly, our results suggest that if Sweden joins the EMU, and the 
ECB continues to aim at an inflation rate below two percent, then (ceteris 
paribus) Sweden would move even further away from a point of minimum 
unemployment and maximum output. With inflation targeted at one 
percent, i.e., at the average of the ECB’s inflation band, Swedish 
27 
 
 unemployment would approach six percent.
27 The EEAG proposition that 
medium-run average inflation should be targeted at 2.5 percent is a step in 
the right direction but, nevertheless, too low a target from a Swedish 
perspective.
28  
Finally, our results may point at a potential problem inherent with the 
EMU project. As we compare our results to those for the U.S. in Akerlof et 
al. (2000), and for Canada in Fortin and Dumont (2000), we find that the 
lowest sustainable unemployment rate is considerably lower and the 
associated inflation rate slightly higher in Sweden.
29 While detailed studies 
on other countries are needed, there is, of course, nothing to suggest that 
the Phillips curves are similar, or even remotely so, across countries. For 
instance, with the present UK target set higher than the Swedish, EMU 
membership could very well imply a major unemployment increase also for 
this country. A crucial observation is that even if an inflation level could be 
determined that minimizes unemployment for the Euro area, this level 
could still generate unacceptable unemployment rates in individual member 
states. The rejection of a national inflation target would then be a major 
cost of EMU membership. If the unemployment-inflation trade-off differs 
greatly, it would be a highly delicate, and possibly insurmountable, issue 
for the union to agree on a common inflation target.  
It could, of course, be argued that the model is specified without any 
costs of inflation that would make a target at, say, four percent less 
desirable. However, there is little or no evidence that four percent inflation 
would be significantly more costly than two percent. Changing the inflation 
target may involve short run adjustment costs as it takes time to establish 
credibility for a new target. (The alternative route of EMU membership 
would of course lead to similar adjustment costs.) Nevertheless, it must be 
difficult to argue convincingly that such costs would exceed the gains in 
terms of higher employment and output. As long as there are no costs of 
slightly higher inflation, even skeptics of the theoretical framework or the 
                                                           
27 See the regressions based on survey data in Figure 6. Some argue that the ECB’s 
effective target is 1.5 percent. This rate would yield a Swedish unemployment rate of 5-
5.5 percent. 
28 See CESifo (2003). EEAG is the European Economic Advisory Group. 
29 A majority of the regressions for the U.S. suggests an LSURI in the 2.5-3 percent 
range. The results for Canada point at an LSURI of approximately 2.8 percent. Using 
total rather than open unemployment would perhaps result in a more accurate 
comparison of our results to those for the U.S. and Canada (open unemployment would 
be considerably higher in Sweden in the absence of labor market programs). 
Regressions on total unemployment yield results closer to those reported for the U.S. 
and Canada (see Figure A1 in Appendix 2). 
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 empirical results should be able to accept a higher target as a measure to 
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 Appendix 1 
 
Data  
CPI (Consumer Price Index): 
1959:1-2000:2 from Statistics Sweden.   
Our quarterly data are calculated as arithmetic averages of the monthly figures. 
We use an annualized inflation rate, obtained by (CPIt-CPIt-1)/CPIt-1. 
 
IPI (Import Price Index): 
1963:1-2000:2 from Statistics Sweden. 
This index reflects the prices of goods imported to Sweden. Our quarterly data are 
calculated as arithmetic averages of the monthly figures. 
 
Import shares: 
1963-2000 from Statistics Sweden. 
For each year we calculate the value of goods and services imported to Sweden as a 
share of GDP at market prices. We then assign the same import share to each quarter. 
 
Survey data on expected inflation: 
1979:3-2000:2 from the National Institute of Economic Research. Quarterly data on 
households’ expectations on CPI one year ahead, collected every quarter. 
 
Unemployment: 
1959:1-2000:2 from Statistics Sweden (AKU).  




1965:1-2000:2 from Statistics Sweden (AKU). Seasonally adjusted data on open 
unemployment plus workers in active labor market programs (aged 16-64). 
 
Male unemployment: 
1959:1-2000:2 from Statistics Sweden (AKU). Seasonally adjusted data on open 
unemployment for men aged 25-54 
 
Dummy variables: 
1.  D1=1 for 1970:3-1970:4, zero otherwise. 
2.  D2=1 for 1973:1-1974:1, zero otherwise. 
3.  D3=1 for 1974:3, zero otherwise. 
4.  D4=1 for 1975:3, zero otherwise. 
5.  D5=1 for 1979:1-1980:1, zero otherwise. 
6.  D6=1 for 1980:2-1981:3, zero otherwise. 
7.  D7=1 for 1981:4-1983:3, zero otherwise. 
8.  D8=1 for 1986:1-1986:4, zero otherwise. 
9.  D9=1 for 1990:1-1991:2, zero otherwise. 
10. D10=1 for 1995:3-1996:2, zero otherwise. 
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 Appendix 2 
 
Robustness 
Using estimated expectations, we first explore the relationship between inflation 
and total, rather than open, unemployment. Since government expenditures affect 
open unemployment, and also change over the business cycle, one could argue 
that total unemployment better captures the relevant labor market situation. We 
therefore want to see if the LSURI we obtained based on open unemployment 
also will yield a lowest sustainable total unemployment. Moreover, using total 
unemployment may simplify a comparison of our results to those that ADP 
obtained for the U.S. since open unemployment would be considerably higher in 
Sweden in the absence of labor market programs.  
 















Table A1, models A1 and A2, displays some selected results based on total 
unemployment. A comparison with the results in Table 1 above show that the 
LSURI estimates are similar. In Figure A1, we show the long run Phillips curve 
for total unemployment and, for comparison, we have reproduced the curve 
based on open unemployment (see Figure 3). If the purpose is to minimize the 
sustainable total unemployment, inflation should be at 2.83 percent, i.e., at 
approximately the same rate as previously obtained for open unemployment. The 
lowest sustainable total unemployment rate is 3.89 percent. While this figure is 
considerably closer to the LSURs estimated by ADP it still falls short of what 
appears to be the most common lowest unemployment rates in their study.
30 
Many of their estimated LSURs exceed four percent. 
                                                           
30 ADP never present an “average” estimate of their LSURs to which we may compare 
our estimates. 
32 For sake of comparison with the results of ADP, we have also run some 
regressions based on prime aged males. The results based on open 
unemployment among males of ages 25-54 are presented in Table A1 (models A3 
and A4). As expected, this yielded considerably lower LSURs, but the 
corresponding inflation rates do not differ much from those previously obtained.  
The turbulent Swedish labor market of the 1990s involved a major increase in 
unemployment and a drastic decrease in inflation. It seems reasonable to test if 
the exclusion of the 1990s yields very different results. In Figure A2 we show the 
Phillips curve for 1963:1-1991:2 and (again) the Phillips curve for the period 
1963:1-2000:2 . Excluding the 1990s implies a leftward shift of the curve: at a 
just slightly higher inflation rate than for 1963-2000, the average lowest 
sustainable unemployment rate is now as low as 1.26 percent. This result 
therefore suggests that the inclusion of the turbulent 1990s in data has some 
effect on LSUR, while the inflation rate remains stable.
31 The observed change in 
Figure A2 could indicate that some parameter shifts may have occurred during 
the 1990s, which our model is unable to capture accurately. However, re-
estimating the model for the period 1963-2000 and adding a dummy shift 



















                                                           
31 Table A1, models A5 and A6, reports some results based on the period up until the 
1990s. In particular the latter model yields a very low sustainable unemployment rate 
only slightly exceeding the one percent level. 
33 Table A1.  Estimated parameters for the long run Phillips curve
a 
Independent  
variables and  
characteristics 
Model A1  Model A2  Model A3  Model A4  Model A5  Model A6 
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16-quarter lag 
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weights for each 
year, eq. (24) 
16-quarter lag 
with different 
weights for each 





measure  Total unempl.  Total unempl.  Male unempl.  Male unempl.  Open unempl.  Open unempl. 
No. of unempl. 
lags  2 12 2 12 2 12 
Sample period  1965:1-2000:2  1965:1-2000:2 1963:1-2000:2 1963:1-2000:2 1963:1-1991:2  1963:1-1991:2
LSURI*100  2.77 2.91 2.54 2.65 2.86 2.70 
LSUR*100 4.06 4.26 1.67 1.61 1.32 1.18 
Φ(π=0.0)  0.567 0.725 0.536 0.574 0.040 0.068 
Φ(π=2.0)  0.650 0.776 0.639 0.664 0.115 0.171 
Φ(π=4.0)  0.843 0.892 0.877 0.870 0.671 0.749 
Φ(π=6.0)  0.983 0.979 0.994 0.989 0.999 1.000 
u(π=0.0)  0.077 0.076 0.043 0.040 0.030 0.035 
u(π=2.0)  0.044 0.047 0.018 0.018 0.016 0.015 
u(π=4.0)  0.049 0.048 0.026 0.023 0.019 0.023 
u(π=6.0)  0.072 0.068 0.041 0.038 0.030 0.035 
DW-statistic  1.524 1.534 1.500 1.523 1.509 1.797 
R
2  0.876 0.891 0.872 0.872 0.839 0.839 
a Asymptotic t-values in parentheses. Detailed results for all regressions are available on request.
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